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Abstract---In contemporary debates in religious 
epistemology, theistic philosophers provide differing responses 
to the evidentialist argument against religious beliefs. 
Plantinga’s strategy is to argue that evidence is not needed to 
justify religious beliefs while Swinburne’s strategy is to argue 
that religious beliefs can be justified by evidence. However, in 
Aquinas’ account of religious epistemology, he seems to employ 
both strategies. In his account of religious knowledge by faith, 
he argues that evidence is unnecessary for religious beliefs. But 
in his account of religious knowledge by science, he argues that 
there is evidence for religious beliefs. In this paper, I argue that 
there is no real dichotomy between Plantinga’s and 
Swinburne’s responses to the evidentialist argument. From a 
Thomistic perspective, Reformed Epistemology and Natural 
Theology are different but compatible responses to 
Evidentialism. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary religious epistemology can be 
characterised as a series of responses to the evidentialist 
argument against religious beliefs. The argument can be 
stated briefly. Religious beliefs are justified provided there is 
sufficient evidence for them. Since there is no sufficient 
evidence for them, they are not justified. Christian 
philosophers employ two main strategies against this 
evidentialist argument. The first strategy is to argue that 
evidence is not really necessary for the justification of 
religious beliefs. An important philosopher who employs this 
strategy is Alvin Plantinga [1]. The second strategy is to 
argue that there is indeed sufficient evidence for religious 
beliefs. An important philosopher who employs this strategy 
is Richard Swinburne [2].  
This paper is a presentation of the thought of Thomas 
Aquinas in light of this contemporary debate in religious 
epistemology. His position is an interesting and relevant 
contribution to the debate because he can be interpreted as 
employing both strategies in his Summa Theologiae. In 
Thomas’ account of religious knowledge by faith, he 
employs the first strategy. For him, faith does give human 
beings a form of knowledge [3], but faith is the assent of the 
mind determined by the will and not by reason [4]. Thus he 
seems to hold that evidence is not strictly necessary for the 
justification of religious beliefs. In Thomas’ account of 
religious knowledge by science, he employs the second 
strategy. He famously provides the five ways of proving the 
existence of God at the beginning of his work [5]. So he also 
seems to argue that there is sufficient evidence for some 
religious beliefs. As a result, it will be argued that Thomas’ 
religious epistemology shows that Reformed Epistemology 
and Natural Theology are actually compatible with each 
other, even though they are different responses to 
Evidentialism.  
II. EVIDENTIALISM, REFORMED 
EPISTEMOLOGY AND NATURAL THEOLOGY 
This second section contains the background for the 
subsequent discussion of Thomistic religious epistemology 
and it is in three main parts. The first part is a brief 
introduction to Evidentialism and one of the main debates in 
contemporary epistemology of religion. The second part is a 
short study of Alvin Plantinga’s position of Reformed 
Epistemology while the third part is a short study of Richard 
Swinburne’s position of Natural Theology.  
A. Evidentialism 
Evidentialism is based on a particular theory of 
procedure in epistemology. According to this theory, there is 
an analogy between the legal sphere and the religious sphere. 
In a legal system, the guilt of a defendant is considered to be 
false until it is proven to be true. The prosecution should 
prove that someone is guilty of a crime by providing 
evidence. Similarly, in the religious sphere, the existence of 
God is considered to be false until it is proven to be true. 
Religious believers should prove that the existence of God is 
true by providing evidence [6]. An example of a philosopher 
who argued for this version of Evidentialism was Anthony 
Flew [7]. On this account, religious beliefs would be 
considered false until they are shown to be true based on 
evidence. As a result, knowledge of religious beliefs is 
possible but it is dependent on philosophical argument [8]. 
B. Contemporary religious epistemology 
A major debate in contemporary religious epistemology 
involves the question of whether evidentialism should be 
applied to knowledge claims about religious beliefs, or 
whether different epistemic standards apply to knowledge 
claims about religious beliefs.  
The evidentialist argument against religious beliefs can 
be expressed as such: 
 Religious beliefs are justified only if there is sufficient 
evidence for them. 
 There is no sufficient evidence for religious beliefs. 
 Therefore, religious beliefs are not justified [9]. 
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Theistic philosophers employ two main strategies 
against the evidentialist position. One strategy is to attack the 
first premise. This strategy is to argue that evidence is not 
really necessary for the justification of religious beliefs. An 
example of this position is Reformed Epistemology and an 
important philosopher who argues for this position is Alvin 
Plantinga. Another strategy is to attack the second premise. 
This strategy is to argue that there is indeed sufficient 
evidence for religious beliefs. An example of this position is 
Natural Theology and an important philosopher who argues 
for this position is Richard Swinburne [10]. 
C. Reformed Epistemology 
In his account of Reformed Epistemology, Plantinga 
argues that evidence is not really necessary for the 
justification of religious beliefs. According to him, human 
beings form beliefs by means of their cognitive faculties. For 
example, human beings use their faculties to perform acts of 
perception, introspection and memory. Thus human beings 
use their cognitive faculties to form beliefs about the 
universe, moral issues, other persons and also about God. On 
this account, God created human beings with a sort of sense 
of the divine. It is a cognitive faculty to form beliefs about 
God and this faculty is analogous to sense perception. 
Human beings use this cognitive faculty to form beliefs 
about God’s existence and attributes [11]. In addition, this 
belief-forming process is largely involuntary. Plantinga 
writes: 
These faculties work in such a way that under the 
appropriate circumstances we form the appropriate belief. 
More exactly, the appropriate belief is formed in us. In the 
typical case we do not decide to hold or form the belief in 
question, but simply find ourselves with it [12]. 
Plantinga next provides an account of how beliefs about 
God are formed in human beings. It is a Christian account 
since it presents the concept of God as Trinity and the 
concept of divine revelation as found in the Bible. It is a 
process which involves three steps. First, God arranged for 
divine revelation in the form of a collection of written books 
called the Bible. The main topic of the Bible is to reveal 
God’s plan of salvation for all human beings. Second, an 
individual gets to know about God’s plan of salvation by 
hearing about it from someone else or by reading the Bible. 
Through the work of the Holy Spirit, one comes to see that 
God’s plan of salvation is a real offer for oneself. Third, if 
one accepts God’s plan of salvation then the Holy Spirit 
produces faith in oneself. This faith consists of a conviction 
that Christian teachings are really true [13]. This is how 
Plantinga describes the cognitive state of faith: 
The resulting belief can be of maximal firmness; it can 
also be much more tentative and fragile. What is central 
to the process is this work of the Holy Spirit in 
producing faith, whereby Christians come to grasp and 
believe, endorse and rejoice in the main lines of the 
Christian gospel [14]. 
Plantinga stresses that faith is not a cognitive state which 
is different from knowledge as a cognitive state. Instead, 
faith is a type of knowledge as a cognitive state. He writes: 
Faith is not to be contrasted with knowledge; rather, if 
things go properly, it just is a certain kind of knowledge, 
and knowledge of truths of the greatest importance [15]. 
Plantinga then provides a theory of knowledge. 
According to him, knowledge can be defined as warranted 
true belief and warrant is understood in terms of the proper 
functioning of cognitive faculties [16]. There are three main 
conditions for a belief to be considered warranted. First, a 
belief is warranted if the belief is formed by properly 
functioning cognitive faculties. Second, a belief is warranted 
if the belief is formed in an environment appropriate to the 
cognitive faculties. Third, a belief is warranted if the belief is 
formed by cognitive faculties which are successfully 
designed to produce true beliefs [17]. The following then is 
Plantinga’s definition of warrant: 
The way to put it, then, is that a belief B has warrant for 
a person S if and only if B is produced by properly 
functioning faculties in an appropriate environment 
according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth 
[18]. 
On this account, faith refers to belief in Christian 
teachings. This belief is produced in an individual by the 
Holy Spirit by a supernatural belief-producing process. As it 
is a belief formed by properly functioning faculties in an 
appropriate environment according to a design plan 
successfully aimed at truth, it is a warranted belief. Moreover, 
if the belief is true and if the belief is held sufficiently firmly, 
then this belief is considered to be knowledge [19]. So this is 
how Plantinga argues that religious belief is justified (or 
warranted) without evidence.  
D. Natural Theology 
In his account of Natural Theology, Swinburne argues 
that there is sufficient evidence for religious beliefs. 
According to him, scientists observe data and propose 
hypotheses to explain the data. Scientists use certain criteria 
to determine how one hypothesis is better than another 
hypothesis in explaining the observed data. By using the 
same criteria that scientists use, one can show that the 
hypothesis that God exists explains everything observable 
[20]. For him, it is the scientific method itself which leads to 
the conclusion that God exists. Swinburne writes: 
The very same criteria which scientists use to reach their 
own theories lead us to move beyond those theories to a 
creator God who sustains everything in existence [21]. 
Thus, in his account of natural theology, knowledge of 
God can also be said to originate from scientific knowledge 
and knowledge of God is consistent with scientific 
knowledge. 
Swinburne next draws a distinction between two main 
types of explanations. On this view, an explanation is an 
account of how objects cause events. The first is inanimate 
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explanation. This refers to an account of how events are 
caused by objects in terms of powers and liabilities, that is, 
impersonal causation. The second is personal explanation. 
This refers to an account of how events are caused by objects 
in terms of beliefs and purposes, that is, intentional causation. 
Different events are caused by different objects. Some events 
are not intentionally caused by inanimate objects, while other 
events are intentionally caused by persons. The various 
sciences work by giving different types of explanations of 
events. Physics, chemistry and biology work by giving 
inanimate explanations while history, psychology and 
sociology work by giving personal explanations [22]. But 
inanimate causation and personal causation do interact with 
each other, as inanimate causes affect personal causes and 
personal causes affect inanimate causes [23]. 
Further, there are four different levels of explanations: 
partial, full, complete and ultimate. First, a partial 
explanation is an account of how an event is probably caused 
by inanimate objects in terms of their powers and liabilities 
or by personal objects in terms of their beliefs and purposes. 
Second, a full explanation is an account of how an event is 
necessarily caused by inanimate objects in terms of their 
powers and liabilities or by personal objects in terms of their 
beliefs and purposes. Third, a complete explanation is a full 
explanation of an event in terms of its causes by referring to 
their most basic powers and liabilities or their most basic 
beliefs and purposes [24]. Fourth, an ultimate explanation is 
a complete explanation of an event in terms of its causes 
which do not allow for further explanations, that is, either 
partial explanations or full explanations. Philosophy involves 
the quest for an ultimate explanation of everything 
observable. It is the search for something which is the 
explanation for the existence and properties of everything 
else [25]. 
For Swinburne, there are also three possibilities for an 
ultimate explanation: materialism, theism and humanism. 
Materialism is the worldview that all the causes involved in 
personal explanation have a complete inanimate explanation. 
An ultimate materialistic explanation would involve either a 
material state or a state without a beginning which is the 
explanation for everything else. Theism is the worldview that 
all the causes involved in inanimate explanation have a 
complete personal explanation. An ultimate theistic 
explanation would involve a person who is the explanation 
for everything else. Humanism is the worldview that 
involves both inanimate explanation and personal 
explanation. An ultimate humanistic explanation is a mixed 
theory which rejects both materialism and theism: all the 
causes involved in personal explanation do not have a 
complete inanimate explanation and all the causes involved 
in inanimate explanation do not have a complete personal 
explanation [26]. 
Moreover, the ultimate explanation of everything 
observable which is most likely to be true must fulfil three 
main conditions. First, it must be simple. Second, it must be 
able to explain the existence of everything observable 
accurately. Third, it must be better than other possible 
explanations. Swinburne claims that theism is the best 
ultimate explanation because it is better than materialism and 
humanism. He argues that materialism is an explanation less 
simple than theism and that materialism cannot explain many 
observable phenomena. He also argues that humanism is an 
explanation even less simple than materialism [27]. On this 
account, materialism is a very complex explanation because 
it postulates a great number of material objects as causes to 
explain the existence and properties of everything observable. 
On the other hand, theism is a very simple explanation 
because it postulates only one person as a cause to explain 
the existence and properties of everything observable [28]. 
An ultimate explanation must provide an account of the 
existence and properties of everything observable. The 
universe contains a great number of objects which share the 
same powers and liabilities. For instance, the laws of nature 
apply throughout the known universe. A materialist ultimate 
explanation can only account for an object’s particular 
powers and liabilities in terms of its general powers and 
liabilities. But it cannot explain an object’s most general 
powers and liabilities. For example, the behaviour of atoms 
and electrons can be explained in terms of the law of gravity. 
But a materialist ultimate explanation cannot account for the 
fact that all atoms and electrons obey the law of gravity. 
Therefore, a materialist ultimate explanation cannot account 
for the fact that every object in the universe shares the same 
powers and liabilities [29]. 
Additionally, the universe contains material objects of 
the same kind which share the same powers and liabilities. A 
materialist ultimate explanation can only explain material 
objects of the same kind which share the same powers and 
liabilities in terms of other material objects of the same kind 
which share the same powers and liabilities. For example, 
every electron behaves just like every other electron, and 
electrons are explained in terms of neutrons. Therefore, a 
materialist ultimate explanation would be in terms of objects 
of the same kind which share the same powers and liabilities, 
like matter or energy [30]. 
On the other hand, a theistic ultimate explanation can 
provide a simpler account of the existence and properties of 
everything observable. The universe contains a great number 
of objects which share the same powers and liabilities 
because it was created by God. God can be the cause since he 
is understood as an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good 
person who is the creator of the world and who maintains the 
world in existence. God is able to create the universe with its 
great order because he is all-powerful. God wanted to create 
the universe with human persons because he is all-good. On 
this account, God created the universe with its laws of nature 
because he wanted the universe to be suitable for human 
beings. Further, God wanted to create the universe with its 
great order because an ordered universe is a beautiful 
universe. Beauty is a great good in itself and God wanted to 
create a beautiful universe because he is all-good [31]. The 
following is how Swinburne summarises his argument that 
theism is a better hypothesis than materialism: 
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The hypothesis of theism is a simple hypothesis which 
leads us to expect these observable phenomena, when no 
other simple hypothesis will do so. The perfect goodness 
of God follows from his three simple properties of being 
essentially omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly free. It 
follows from his goodness that he is likely to produce 
humans, and it is necessary for our survival that we live 
in a universe with the sort of regularity we find. On the 
materialist hypothesis it is a mere coincidence that 
material objects have the same powers as each other, and 
not a simple stopping point for explanation. Because 
theism satisfies the criteria so well, the existence and 
regular behaviour of material objects provide good 
evidence for the existence of God [32]. 
So this is how Swinburne argues that there is sufficient 
evidence for religious belief. 
III. KNOWLEDGE OF GOD BY FAITH 
This third section contains a discussion of Thomistic 
religious epistemology with respect to faith and it is in two 
main parts. The first part deals with the arguments for 
religious knowledge by means of faith in the Summa 
Theologiae. Thomas distinguishes between the object of faith, 
the act of faith and the virtue of faith. The second part 
contains a comparison between the religious epistemologies 
of Thomas and Plantinga. The discussion is focussed on the 
similarities and differences between the two accounts.  
A. The object of faith 
According to Thomas, “faith is a mean between science 
and opinion [33].” On this account, faith requires intellectual 
assent. The intellect can be moved to assent by the object of 
knowledge. This happens when the object is known in itself 
or when the object is known through the knowledge of 
something else. The intellect can also be moved by choice. 
Thomas distinguishes opinion from faith. Opinion is the state 
where one chooses to give intellectual assent to something 
with doubt. Faith is the state where one chooses to give 
intellectual assent to something with certainty. On this 
account, opinion and faith are directed to objects of 
knowledge which are not seen by the intellect or the senses 
[34]. 
In his religious epistemology, Thomas distinguishes 
between science and faith. Science refers to knowledge with 
certainty of a conclusion through demonstration. Science is 
knowledge of objects which are seen while faith is 
knowledge of objects which are not seen. So an object of 
knowledge cannot be an object of science and an object of 
faith at the same time and with the same respect. However, it 
is possible for an object of knowledge to be an object of 
science for one person and the same object of knowledge to 
be an object of faith for another person [35]. 
B. The act of faith 
Regarding the act of knowledge by faith, for Thomas, to 
believe is “to think with assent”. To think refers to the 
intellectual activity of inquiry while the intellect has not 
attained the certainty of seeing the object of knowledge. To 
believe refers to the intellectual activity of assenting to an 
object of knowledge which the intellect is still inquiring 
about. Science is an intellectual act with firm assent to one 
position with understanding and it occurs in a mind with 
formed thought. There are other intellectual acts without firm 
assent and they occur in a mind with unformed thought. 
Doubt refers to no assent to any position. Suspicion refers to 
assent to one position or another because of slight motives. 
Opinion refers to assent to one position with fear of another 
position. However, belief is an intellectual act with firm 
assent to one position even though it occurs in a mind with 
unformed thought [36]. Specifically, belief is an intellectual 
act with firm assent to one position where the intellect is 
determined by the will [37]. 
According to Thomas, the objects of faith which are 
necessary for belief include even those which could be 
discovered by reason. He provides three reasons for this. 
First, belief in the objects of faith knowable by reason is 
necessary so that people could know the objects of faith more 
quickly. This is because the proofs for the existence of God 
require a long period of study and knowledge of many 
different fields of science. Second, belief in the objects of 
faith knowable by reason is necessary so that more people 
could know the objects of faith. This is because many people 
either lack the intelligence, the free time or the interest to 
study the things concerning God. Third, belief in the objects 
of faith knowable by reason is necessary so that people could 
know the objects of faith with certainty. This is because the 
thinkers who studied the things concerning God have made 
various mistakes and have contradicted each other [38]. 
The act of faith is “an act of the intellect assenting to the 
Divine truth at the command of the will moved by the grace 
of God” [39]. The religious believer has sufficient motives 
for making the act of faith. This is because the believer is 
moved by God’s authority to accept divine truth which is 
confirmed by miracles. The believer is also drawn to accept 
divine truth by the inner inspiration from God. Although the 
believer has sufficient motives for knowledge by faith, the 
believer does not have sufficient reasons for knowledge by 
science [40]. 
C. The virtue of faith 
Thomas also discusses the question of whether 
knowledge by faith is more certain than knowledge by 
science. This question can be seen in two ways: from the 
point of view of the cause of knowledge and from the point 
of view of the subject of knowledge. From the point of view 
of the cause, knowledge is more certain if it is caused by a 
more certain source. Hence, knowledge by faith is more 
certain because it is caused by divine truth while knowledge 
by science is less certain because it is caused by human 
reason. But from the point of view of the subject, knowledge 
is more certain if the object of knowledge is better grasped 
by the human intellect. Knowledge by faith is less certain 
because the object of faith is above the human intellect while 
knowledge by science is more certain because it is not above 
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the human intellect. Thus, simply speaking, knowledge by 
faith is more certain than knowledge by science because the 
cause of knowledge by faith is more certain than the cause of 
knowledge by science. But, relatively speaking, knowledge 
by faith is less certain than knowledge by science because the 
human intellect grasps the object of science better than the 
object of faith [41]. 
D. Thomas and Plantinga 
In light of the above, this next part is a comparison 
between the religious epistemologies of Thomas and 
Plantinga. Thomas’ account of knowledge by faith and 
Plantinga’s account of Reformed Epistemology can be said 
to be in broad agreement on two important points. First, for 
Plantinga, faith involves beliefs about God and these beliefs 
are formed in human cognitive faculties. For Thomas, faith 
also involves beliefs about God (the propositions of faith) 
and these beliefs are formed in the human intellect. Second, 
for Plantinga, the formation of faith is a process which 
involves three steps. God first arranged for divine revelation 
in the form of a collection of written books called the Bible. 
An individual subsequently gets to know about God’s plan of 
salvation by hearing about it from someone else or by 
reading the Bible. Then if one accepts God’s plan of 
salvation, the Holy Spirit produces faith in oneself. Similarly, 
for Thomas, the formation of faith can be seen as a process 
which involves three steps. For the act of faith to be formed 
there must first be a set of divine truths which are revealed 
by God to be explicitly believed. Then the believer is 
induced to assent in an external way through witnessing a 
miracle or by being persuaded by someone to believe. The 
believer is finally induced to assent in an internal way by 
being moved by God’s grace. 
However, Thomas’ account of knowledge by faith and 
Plantinga’s account of Reformed Epistemology are different 
on two important points. First, for Plantinga, faith as a 
cognitive state is not different from knowledge as a cognitive 
state. Rather, faith is a type of knowledge as a cognitive state. 
But, for Thomas, faith is a mean between science and 
opinion. Although faith is a type of knowledge, science is 
different from faith. Science is knowledge of objects which 
are seen while faith is knowledge of objects which are not 
seen. In Plantinga’s account, religious knowledge and 
ordinary human knowledge occur in the same 
epistemological state. In both cases, beliefs are formed by 
properly functioning faculties in an appropriate environment 
according to a design plan successfully aimed at truth. The 
difference is that religious knowledge is produced by a 
supernatural belief-forming process while ordinary human 
knowledge is produced by a natural belief-forming process. 
In Thomas’ account, religious knowledge and ordinary 
human knowledge do not occur in the same epistemological 
state. In the case of religious knowledge, the intellect assents 
with certainty to the propositions of faith with the movement 
of the will. In the case of ordinary human knowledge, the 
intellect assents with certainty to the propositions of 
knowledge without the movement of the will.  
Second, for Plantinga, human beings form beliefs by 
means of their cognitive faculties. Human beings use their 
cognitive faculties to form beliefs about the universe, moral 
issues, other persons and also about God. God created human 
beings with a sense of the divine to form beliefs about God 
and this faculty is analogous to sense perception. Human 
beings use this cognitive faculty to form beliefs about God’s 
existence and attributes. This belief-forming process is 
largely involuntary because the cognitive faculties work 
under appropriate circumstances so that appropriate beliefs 
are formed in human beings. In Plantinga’s account, human 
beings do not decide to hold or to form beliefs. Instead, 
human beings simply find themselves with certain beliefs.  
But, for Thomas, there is a clear distinction between 
belief and science. The faculty to form beliefs about God is 
not analogous to sense perception. This is because belief is 
directed to objects of knowledge which are not seen by the 
intellect or the senses. In the case of belief, the intellect 
assents with certainty to the object of knowledge with the 
movement of the will. In the case of science, the intellect 
assents with certainty to the object of knowledge without the 
movement of the will. In Thomas’ account, human beings do 
decide to hold or to form beliefs. Human beings do not 
simply find themselves with certain beliefs because beliefs 
are formed with an act of the will. 
 
IV. KNOWLEDGE OF GOD BY SCIENCE 
This fourth section contains a discussion of Thomistic 
religious epistemology with respect to science and it is in two 
main parts. The first part is a discussion of Thomas’ 
treatment of human knowledge of material objects, the mode 
and order of understanding in human knowledge and human 
knowledge of God. The second part contains a comparison 
between Thomas and Swinburne. The discussion is mainly 
focussed on the points of agreement between Thomas’ 
position and Swinburne’s position.  
A. How the human soul understands material things 
On Thomas’ view of knowledge by science, the soul 
knows bodies through the intellect by knowledge which is 
“immaterial, universal and necessary” [42]. Further, the 
intellect knows bodies by understanding them “through 
immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul 
by their own essence” [43]. According to Thomas, 
knowledge is in inverse proportion to materiality:  
But the more immaterially a thing receives the form of 
the thing known, the more perfect is its knowledge. 
Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not 
only from matter, but also from the individuating 
conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than 
the senses, which receive the form of the thing known, 
without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions 
[44].  
Therefore, the intellect is said to know more perfectly than 
the senses. The soul is in potentiality through the senses to all 
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sensible things and the soul is in potentiality through the 
intellect to all intelligible things [45]. In addition:  
the Divine Essence is a perfect likeness of all, 
whatsoever may be found to exist in things created, 
being the universal principle of all [46].  
Also: 
the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images 
which are the principles of sensing, and to those which 
are the principles of understanding. For this reason 
Aristotle held that the intellect by which the soul 
understands has no innate species, but is at first in 
potentiality to all such species [47].  
According to Thomas, the intellect is understood under 
two aspects: the possible intellect and the agent intellect. The 
possible intellect relates to the agent intellect as potency is 
related to act. This means that the possible intellect is 
reduced from potency to act by the agent intellect [48]. 
For Thomas, phantasms refer to sensible impressions of 
individual material things and phantasms are found in the 
human sense organs [49]. The agent intellect causes 
phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible 
by the process of abstraction. On this account, the senses 
cause intellectual knowledge through the phantasms [50]. 
Phantasms cannot activate the possible intellect by 
themselves as they need to be made intelligible by the agent 
intellect. In this sense, sensible knowledge can be said to be 
the material cause of intellectual knowledge [51]. Since 
phantasms are derived from material things, there are no 
phantasms of immaterial things. The human soul knows 
immaterial things by comparison with material things which 
have phantasms. On this account, the soul understands truth 
by considering a thing in which the soul sees the truth. The 
soul knows God as the cause of material things “by way of 
excess and by way of remotion” [52]. Therefore, the soul 
needs to consider phantasms of material things in order to 
understand something about immaterial things, even though 
immaterial things do not have phantasms [53]. Also: 
our intellect's proper and proportionate object is the 
nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment 
concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all that 
pertains to that thing's nature be known [54]. 
B. The mode of understanding 
For Thomas, there are two important epistemological 
principles. The first principle is that intellectual knowledge 
arises from sensible knowledge. This means that the object of 
knowledge for the senses is singular while the object of 
knowledge for the intellect is universal. The second principle 
is that the intellect proceeds from potency to act. Every 
power that proceeds from potency to act passes through a 
state of incomplete act. This means that there are two 
possible states of intellectual act. The first state is the 
complete intellectual act. This complete intellectual act 
produces an epistemological state where the object of 
knowledge is “distinctly and determinately known” [55]. The 
second state is the incomplete intellectual act. This 
incomplete intellectual act produces an epistemological state 
where the object of knowledge is known “indistinctly, and as 
it were confusedly” [56].  
According to Thomas, essence is the “first and proper 
object” of the intellect. In the process of human knowledge, 
the intellect first understands the essence of a thing. The 
intellect then understands the predicates and dispositions 
which affect the essence of a thing. The intellect then relates 
one thing with another by composing and dividing in the act 
of reasoning [57].  
C. How God is known in the human soul 
According to Thomas, the greatest happiness for the 
human soul is use of the intellect. The soul has a natural 
desire to know causes of effects and God is the first cause. 
Therefore, the human intellect can see God’s essence [58]. 
The created intellect does not see God’s essence through a 
likeness. God is the creator of intellectual power and can be 
seen by the intellect. The intellectual power “is called an 
intelligible light, as it were, derived from the first light” [59]. 
Some likeness in visual power is required to see God’s 
essence. Thus the light of glory gives the intellect the power 
to see God [60]. God’s essence cannot be seen with bodily 
eyes as the power of the sensitive part of the soul is an act of 
a bodily organ. Thomas writes: 
Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. 
Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. 
For God is incorporeal, as was shown above. Hence He 
cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by 
the intellect [61].  
However, those who see God’s essence do not 
comprehend God. For Thomas, comprehension means 
perfect knowledge. This refers to the epistemological state of 
knowing something as far as it can be known. For example, 
knowledge by scientific demonstration is comprehension. On 
the other hand, knowledge by acceptance of probable opinion 
is not comprehension. Things can be known according to 
their actuality. God is infinite being and so he is infinitely 
knowable. The human intellect cannot know God infinitely 
and it knows God’s essence in proportion to the degree of the 
light of glory received. Since the degree of the light of glory 
received into the intellect cannot be infinite, the human 
intellect cannot know God to an infinite degree. Therefore, 
the human intellect cannot comprehend God [62]. 
According to Thomas, no one in this life can see God’s 
essence. The knowledge of every knower is according to the 
mode of its nature. The human soul exists in bodily matter 
and knows a form in matter. But God’s essence cannot be 
known through material things. Therefore, it is impossible 
for a soul to see God’s essence in this life [63]. However, the 
human soul can know God in this life by natural reason. 
Thomas explains in an important passage: 
Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our 
natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by 
sensible things. But our mind cannot be led by sense so 
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far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible 
effects of God do not equal the power of God as their 
cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the 
whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can 
His essence be seen. But because they are His effects 
and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so 
far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know 
of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first 
cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him 
[64].  
In another important passage, Thomas explains the 
difference between faith and science as forms of knowledge: 
Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is 
determined by faith to some knowable object. But this 
determination to one object does not proceed from the 
vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is 
believed. Thus as far as faith falls short of vision, it falls 
short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for 
science determines the intellect to one object by the 
vision and understanding of first principles [65]. 
D. Thomas and Swinburne 
The following is a comparison between the religious 
epistemologies of Thomas and Swinburne. Thomas’ account 
of knowledge of God by science and Swinburne’s account of 
Natural Theology are in broad agreement on their basic 
starting points. According to Swinburne, scientists observe 
data and propose hypotheses to explain the data. They use 
certain criteria to determine how one hypothesis is better 
than another hypothesis in explaining the observed data. By 
using the same criteria that scientists use, Swinburne shows 
that the hypothesis that God exists explains everything 
observable. For him, it is the scientific method itself which 
leads to the conclusion that God exists. Theism is proposed 
as an ultimate explanation of everything observable. This is 
the hypothesis which is the explanation for the existence and 
properties of everything else.  
According to Thomas, science has to do with the 
cognition of the causes of things and it is produced by a 
demonstration. Since science is about finding the causes of 
things, the purpose of a demonstration is to produce the 
premises of the demonstrative syllogism. What is needed in 
order to produce a demonstration is to look for the causes of 
what is claimed to be the conclusion of the demonstration. 
Just as scientists propose hypotheses to explain observed data, 
the scientific method consists in looking for the causes of 
what is claimed to be the conclusion of the demonstration. 
For Swinburne, the purpose of a hypothesis in philosophy is 
to propose an ultimate explanation of everything observable. 
Similarly, for Thomas, science has as its main emphasis 
finding ultimate explanations for what is described in the 
conclusions of demonstrative syllogisms. On this account, 
Thomas and Swinburne are also in agreement that science 
has a broad range of meanings. For Swinburne, science can 
refer to physics, chemistry and biology or history, 
psychology and sociology. Similarly, for Thomas, science 
can refer to subjects as varied as mathematics and 
metaphysics.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Thomas’ account of religious epistemology is an 
intriguing and powerful position when it is situated within 
contemporary debates. In his account of religious knowledge 
by faith, one can find weak similarities with Reformed 
Epistemology. In his account of religious knowledge by 
science, one can find strong similarities with Natural 
Theology. 
A. The first strategy 
On the one hand, like Plantinga, Thomas provides 
arguments against the claim that Evidentialism applies to 
religious beliefs in the case where religious beliefs are held 
by faith. For him, the act of faith can be defined as an 
intellectual act which assents to divine truth where this act is 
commanded by the will which is moved by grace. In the act 
of faith, the will is moved by its desire for perfect goodness 
and the will moves the intellect to assent to perfect being. 
The act of faith is epistemologically justified because perfect 
goodness and perfect being are different concepts which refer 
to the same object, namely God. Thomas’ account of 
knowledge by faith shows how a believer is justified in 
believing the propositions of faith, even though it does not 
show how one is able to justify one’s belief that one is 
justified [66]. Thus, in this case, he argues that evidence is 
not strictly necessary for the justification of religious beliefs. 
B. The second strategy 
On the other hand, like Swinburne, Thomas provides 
arguments for the claim that Evidentialism applies to 
religious beliefs in the case where religious beliefs are held 
by science. For him, knowledge by science is having a 
perfect cognition of an object of knowledge. On this account, 
science is understood as the cognition of the cause of the 
object of knowledge. Intellectual knowledge is caused by the 
senses through the phantasms. Since there are no phantasms 
of immaterial things, the human soul knows immaterial 
things by comparison with material things which have 
phantasms. Thus human beings can know God in this life by 
natural reason. Natural knowledge begins from sense and can 
go as far as it is led by sensible things. The intellect can be 
led by sensible things to know whether God exists because 
they are His effects and depend on Him [67]. So, in this case, 
Thomas also argues that there is sufficient evidence for 
religious beliefs. 
C. Intellect and Will 
It might seem strange for Thomas to employ both 
strategies. It appears contradictory to argue both that 
evidence is not necessary for the justification of religious 
beliefs and that there is sufficient evidence for religious 
beliefs. A brief explanation is necessary. In his anthropology, 
the two main powers of the human soul are intellect and will. 
The intellect is the power of the soul to apprehend universal 
being and truth. The will is the power of the soul to desire 
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universal good. There is a sense in which the intellect can be 
understood to be superior to the will. But there is also a sense 
in which the will can be understood to be superior to the 
intellect. In the first sense, the will, its act and its object can 
be seen under the notion of being and truth. In this sense, the 
intellect is superior to the will and commands it. However, in 
the second sense, the intellect, its act and its object can also 
be seen under the notion of good. In this sense, the will is 
superior to the intellect and can move it [68]. Thomas 
explains:  
From this we can easily understand why these powers 
include one another in their acts, because the intellect 
understands that the will wills, and the will wills the 
intellect to understand. In the same way good is 
contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, 
and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good [69]. 
In the case of religious knowledge by faith, it is the will 
which moves the intellect to assent to God. In the case of 
religious knowledge by science, it is the intellect which 
commands the will to desire God. In Thomas’ anthropology, 
the powers of the intellect and the will are interrelated. This 
is because, in Thomas’ metaphysics, universal being and 
truth and universal good are in reality interchangeable since 
they both refer to God. Therefore, it is not contradictory for 
him to argue both that evidence is not necessary for the 
justification of religious beliefs and that there is sufficient 
evidence for religious beliefs.  
D. Key research findings 
Thomas’ account of religious epistemology is rich 
enough to employ a dual strategy in offering a response to 
the evidentialist objection to religious knowledge. His 
accounts of anthropology and metaphysics show why 
arguing that evidence is not necessary for the justification of 
religious beliefs is logically compatible with arguing that 
there is sufficient evidence for religious beliefs. Thus 
Thomistic religious epistemology proposes a fresh way of 
viewing the contemporary debate because there is no real 
dichotomy between the two different responses to the 
evidentialist objection to religious knowledge. Given the 
importance of the evidentialist challenge, this perspective 
serves to strengthen the positions of theistic philosophers 
since they are actually working with and not against each 
other. Thomistic religious epistemology shows that the 
objectives of Reformed Epistemology are actually logically 
compatible with the objectives of Natural Theology.  
Besides showing that Reformed Epistemology is 
compatible with Natural Theology, Thomistic religious 
epistemology also shows that both positions are actually 
necessary in offering an adequate response to the 
evidentialist objection to religious knowledge. When seen in 
the light of Thomistic philosophy, Reformed Epistemology 
can be interpreted as an epistemological account of religious 
knowledge in the believer. Believers who already have faith 
do not require evidence for religious beliefs. On the other 
hand, when seen in the light of Thomistic philosophy, 
Natural Theology can be interpreted as an epistemological 
account of religious knowledge in the non-believer. Non-
believers who do not have faith do require evidence for 
religious beliefs. An important and recent example of a non-
believer who required evidence for religious belief was 
Anthony Flew who successfully acquired sufficient evidence 
for belief in the existence of God [70]. 
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